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An Economic Interpretation of Rhode Island’s 1788 Referendum on the Constitution
Ruth Wallis Herndon and John E. Murray

On 24 March 1788, the voters of Tiverton, Rhode Island, met at Mr. Nathaniel Briggs’
dwelling house to decide whether or not to support ratification of the proposed Federal
Constitution. Town clerk Walter Cook recorded in meticulous handwriting the names and votes
of all freemen present: twenty-three yeas and ninety-two nays.1 (Briggs abstained from voting;
Cook voted no.) On the same date, a similar meeting took place in Portsmouth, Rhode Island,
the western terminus of the ferries that linked the two towns across the Sakonnet River.2
Portsmouth town clerk Abraham Anthony, Jr., used his very best handwriting as he wrote out a
list of the votes to forward to the secretary of the Rhode Island General Assembly: twelve yeas
and sixty nays.3 (Anthony abstained from voting.)
One month earlier, Rhode Island’s General Assembly had ordered a popular referendum
on adoption of the Constitution, declaring that a state ratifying convention was insufficient;
Rhode Island’s voters should decide a constitutional matter. On 24 March 1788, every town
convened a meeting, and every town clerk wrote down the names and votes of the freemen who
participated. State-wide, 238 freemen voted for ratification; 2,714 freemen voted against it – that
is, 8 percent for and 92 against adopting the new Constitution.4 (See Table 1.)
1

“Papers Relating to the Adoption of the Constitution of the United States,” manuscript file,
Rhode Island State Archives, 25.
2
A Patchwork History of Tiverton, Rhode Island, 1976 Bicentennial Edition (Tiverton: privately
printed, n.d.), 36.
3
“Papers Relating to the Adoption,” 17. Anthony’s handwriting in the other meeting minutes of
this time is not nearly so precise and elegant as on the voting list that he sent to the General
Assembly.
4
The official state record shows the total vote (inaccurately) as 237 yeas and 2,708 nays (John
Russell Bartlett, ed., Records of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations in New
England [Providence: The Providence Press Company, 1865], 10:275). John P. Kaminski et al

Alone among the thirteen states, Rhode Island held a popular referendum on ratification
of the Constitution. In the two years following the referendum, a majority in the state legislature
defeated eleven attempts to call a ratifying convention, claiming that the will of the people had
been declared on 24 March 1788.5 Only after Rhode Island had stood by itself outside the Union
for several months did anti-Constitution sentiment waver. The General Assembly finally called a
ratifying convention in the spring of 1790 and Rhode Island voted to enter the Union on 29 May
1790, adopting the Constitution by a narrow margin.
By strongly rejecting ratification in 1788, Rhode Island’s freemen revealed the extent of
popular resistance to the Constitution. The farmers, artisans, craftsmen, and small merchants of
Rhode Island’s towns left few details of their lives beyond such formal documents as vital
records, wills, tax lists, and estate inventories. Their votes in this referendum provide valuable
evidence of the opinions of the many who never attended a ratifying convention. Received by
the secretary of Rhode Island’s state legislature 230 years ago, the voter lists are unique, just as
the Rhode Island referendum was unique. The lists are the only systematic record of the
opinions of ordinary people concerning the Federal Constitution. Elites wrote letters to each
other and to the newspapers, airing their opinions in documents available to later generations.
Ordinary freemen may have held their beliefs with equal passion, but their voice votes are the
only documents they left on the issue.

scrutinized the individual town records of the votes and report 238 yeas and 2,714 nays in
Ratification of the Constitution by the States: Rhode Island, volume 25 of The Documentary
History of the Ratification of the Constitution (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society Press,
2012), 421.
5
While some historians have argued that the General Assembly rejected calls for a ratifying
convention on seven occasions, Patrick T. Conley argues convincingly for eleven such attempts
in Democracy in Decline: Rhode Island’s Constitutional Development, 1776-1841 (Providence:
Rhode Island Historical Society, 1977), 109-110 and note.
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That issue was an explosive one. Few state legislatures welcomed the Federal
Constitution and rushed to ratify it by unanimous decision. Most state assemblies divided into
“friends” and “enemies” of the Constitution. Ratification became a highly charged political issue
for the new nation. Historians have zealously investigated the divisions between the proConstitution Federalists and anti-Constitution Antifederalists. Why did the Federalists believe
that the best solution for the nation’s ills was a radical restructuring of the federal government?
Why did the Antifederalists believe that the best solution was a more restrained patching of the
obvious flaws in the Articles of Confederation? Historians have based their arguments largely
on the writings of elites. Do their findings apply to ordinary people?
Rhode Island’s referendum voting lists give us an excellent opportunity to test an
economic interpretation of opinions about the Constitution. In this essay, we concentrate on
seven Rhode Island towns for which we have both voter lists and good tax and estate records:
Exeter, Hopkinton, Jamestown, Little Compton, Middletown, Portsmouth, and Tiverton (see
Appendix 1 for the voter data). The names on these voter lists have been cross-matched with tax
and estate values and the data has been submitted to various statistical tests (see Appendix 2). Of
the seven towns studied, five show a statistically significant difference between the average
wealth of the “yea” voters and the average wealth of the "nay" voters. (See Table 2.) In Exeter,
Hopkinton, Little Compton, Portsmouth, and Tiverton, those who favored ratification were
clearly wealthier than those who opposed it – sometimes more than twice as wealthy. In
Jamestown and Middletown, the sample size is too small to respond to statistical tests. The
Tiverton data (see Table 3) specifically pinpoint personal estate wealth as the major division
between pro-ratification and anti-ratification groups. Alone among the usable tax records, the
Tiverton tax books divide the taxes into subcategories of personal estate (livestock, farm and
3

household goods, shop inventories, slaves, securities, hard money) and real estate (land and
houses). The results of separate analyses on these two subcategories show that the average “yea”
voter possessed five times as much personal estate as the average “nay” voter and more than
twice as much personal estate as the average taxpayer. Similarly, the “yea” voters paid
significantly more real estate tax than the “nay” voters did. The Tiverton data indicate that those
who rejected ratification were, on the whole, middling landholders who had little else beside that
land. In contrast, those who favored ratification were, on the whole, large landholders who also
possessed significant personal estates as well.
The simple means for all seven towns in every tax or estate valuation show that “yea”
voters were wealthier than “nay” voters. Although the statistical significance of the differences
in wealth holds for only five of the seven towns, the data leave the consistent and overwhelming
impression that pro-ratification freemen were far wealthier than anti-ratification freemen. And
while the Rhode Island voter data does not necessarily apply to other states, the data supports a
theory already advanced and buttressed by other, wider evidence: Charles Beard’s argument that
those who favored the Constitution were wealthier, particularly in personal (non-real) estate, than
those opposed to the Constitution.

I. Origins of This Essay
This essay is the product of a long discussion between a social historian (Ruth Herndon)
working in a history department and an economic historian (John Murray) working in an
economics department. John died in the spring of 2018, bringing our collaboration to a close,
and I (Ruth Herndon) have written the final version of this essay after his death, using notes that

4

John left (often in emails) indicating his vision for the project. That vision rested on the
interplay of history and economics, languages that John spoke and wrote with ease.
John Murray and I met when we were both at the University of Toledo (1996-2007).
From our earliest conversations, John made it clear that he considered himself an historian as
well as an economist, and he held himself to the scholarly standards of both disciplines. He
interpreted economic data and put it to work in the service of history. He read history and put it
to work in the service of economics. He understood these different audiences and shaped our
collaborative projects to appeal to both historians and economists.
Over the years we worked together on numerous projects, most of them focusing on poor
people and children in early America. We had our niches of specialization: John studied South
Carolina; I studied New England. We gave papers together on the same conference panels,
applied jointly for external grants, co-authored book chapters and a journal article, and co-edited
an anthology of essays, Children Bound to Labor: The Pauper Apprentice System in Early
America. When the book was published with Cornell University Press, John had a copy of the
cover framed for me; it still holds pride of place on my office wall at Bowling Green State
University.
Early in our scholarly friendship, while wearing his historian hat, John read my
dissertation on Rhode Island towns in the Revolutionary Era.6 When he came to the chapter on
Rhode Island’s referendum on the Constitution, he put on his economist hat and considered the
data’s potential in a new light. We each had other projects in hand, but we agreed to finish the
Referendum project as soon as we could clear our schedules. Clearing our schedules proved an

6

Ruth Wallis Herndon, “Governing the Affairs of the Town: Continuity and Change in Rhode
Island, 1750-1800” (Ph.D. dissertation, American University, 1992); see chapter 5 (104-131).
5

impossible dream, especially after John moved to Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee, in
2011. We continued to discuss the Rhode Island referendum via email and we talked about it
face-to-face whenever our paths crossed. In this essay, I have brought together my original work
and twenty years of relevant conversation with John; in so doing, I hope to create a posthumous
gift from him to his scholarly disciplines.

II. Charles Beard and the Scholarly Debate
At the turn of the twentieth century, a group of historians challenged the prevailing
nationalist interpretation of the Constitution, which held that the Founding Fathers were great
patriots motivated by high moral principles and humanitarian concerns. The challengers,
Progressive historians, argued instead that economic and class self-interest lay behind the
Founding Fathers' desire to craft a stronger central government.7 The most influential of the
Progressives was Charles Beard, author of An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution.
Beard examined the economic backgrounds and holdings of the framers and advocates of the
Constitution and concluded that “the movement for the Constitution of the United States was
originated and carried through principally by four groups of personalty interests which had been
adversely affected under the Articles of Confederation: money, public securities, manufactures,
and trade and shipping.”8 Beard further argued that ratification magnified this interest by
showing a “line of cleavage . . . between substantial personalty interests on the one hand and the
small farming and debtor interests on the other.”9 Personalty, as Beard indicates, referred to
7

Gerald N. Grob and George Athan Billias, eds., Interpretations of American History: Patterns
and Perspectives, 4th ed., vol. 1, To 1877 (New York: The Free Press, 1982), 150-54.
8
Charles Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1935), 324.
9
Ibid., 325.
6

movable forms of property, including slaves, money lent at interest, commercial stock, and
especially (in Beard’s argument) securities issued by the states and Congress in lieu of specie to
those who had rendered war-time service or lent money to the Revolutionary government.10
Realty, on the other hand, referred to land.
Beard’s work became a foil for many later historians. Some historians criticized Beard’s
data base and his use of it. In Charles Beard and the Constitution, Robert Brown combed
through Beard’s evidence and concluded that Beard had used “questionable figures in a manner
open to criticism.”11 Brown argued that realty was a more significant motivating factor than
personalty and that land ownership and the franchise were more widespread than Beard
suggested. Brown concluded that the United States was a highly democratic country in the late
eighteenth century, quite unlike the arena of class conflict that Beard had identified.12
Other historians criticized Beard’s focus on economic motivation as too narrow. Forrest
McDonald accepted Beard’s challenge to historians to do the hard work of “filling in the details”
of the economic interpretation.13 McDonald deliberately adopted Beard’s assumptions and
methods, collected data, and set out to see if the economic interpretation explained the massive
amounts of economic data McDonald had organized concerning delegates to the Constitutional
Convention and subsequent state ratifying conventions. McDonald reported that the economic
interpretation did not work: “Beard’s thesis—that the line of cleavage as regards the Constitution
was between substantial personalty interests on the one hand and small farming and debtor

10

Ibid., 16-17.
Robert E. Brown, Charles Beard and the Constitution: A Critical Analysis of "An Economic
Interpretation of the Constitution" (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 49.
12
Ibid., 54.
13
Forrest McDonald, We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), 16.
11
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interests on the other—is entirely incompatible with the facts.”14 Beard had asked “invalid
questions” and ignored the complex “interplay of conditioning or determining factors.”15
Beard had his defenders. Some historians supported the core of Beard’s interpretation by
insisting that economic factors (and also social factors) are crucial in shaping history. In various
ways, this refined and substantiated the original Progressive interpretation, attributing socioeconomic motives to the Founding Fathers. Merrill Jensen depicted American society as “split
into polarized groups through the [Federation] period.” The writing of the Constitution
amounted to a “conservative counterrevolution” on the part of Federalists determined “to protect
their political and commercial interests.”16
Other scholars favored a more complex intermingling of social, economic, and political
factors. Jackson Turner Main, for example, argued that “there did exist an antagonism between
small and large property holders” which resulted in “a division along lines of class.”17 But Main
was careful to point out that politics contributed to the split between Federalist and
Antifederalist. While Main acknowledged a critical division between merchant and farmer and
between creditor and debtor, he also emphasizes the pressure of local geographical, military, and
political concerns in shaping opinion on the Constitution within each state.18

14

Ibid., 355.
Ibid., 400-401.
16
Grob and Billias, 162.
17
Jackson Turner Main, The Antifederalists: Critics of the Constitution, 1781-1788 (New York:
W. W. Norton & Company, 1974; originally published by University of North Carolina Press,
1961), 261-62, 266.
18
Ibid., 274-81. See also Robert A. Rutland, The Ordeal of the Constitution: The Antifederalists
and the Ratification Struggle of 1787-1788 (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press,
1966). Rutland picked up strands from both McDonald and Main. Even though the FederalistAntifederalist split was not the focus of his book, Rutland nevertheless identified a distinction
between the two groups: unlike the Federalists, the Antifederalists were associated with local
government and the concerns of the people.
15

8

These were the main outlines of the scholarly discussion before John Murray read my
dissertation chapter and turned my attention to the work of economic historians, familiar work in
his discipline. In 1984, Robert McGuire and Robert Ohsfeldt published the first essay in what
they called a “quantitative rehabilitation” of Beard’s interpretation, statistically analyzing the
relationship between the voting behavior of delegates and “their economic and personal
characteristics.”19 McGuire and Ohsfeldt considered both the delegates to the Philadelphia
Convention and the delegates to the state ratifying conventions. They concluded that “the
division of interests at the ratifying conventions generally was consistent with Beard’s view.”20
In following essays, McGuire and Ohsfeldt expanded their database and their methodology, but
maintained their argument that delegates’ economic interest influenced their vote on the
Constitution.21 In their 1989 essay, they carefully pointed to specific kinds of economic holdings
as key to favoring the Constitution: “delegates with merchant interests or delegates who owned
western lands, large amounts of public securities, slaves, or who represented inland counties.”22
In their 2007 article, Jac Heckelman and Keith Dougherty neatly summarized McGuire’s and
Ohsfeldt’s signal contribution: “they did not claim, as Beard had, that owning real estate or
securities fully explained voting patterns. Rather, they showed that personal ideology,
constituent ideology, and constituent economic interests were also important.”23
19

Robert A. McGuire and Robert L. Ohsfeldt, “Economic Interests and the American
Constitution: A Quantitative Rehabilitation of Charles A. Beard,” The Journal of Economic
History 44:2 (1984): 509-19; quotations from p. 509.
20
Ibid., 517.
21
Robert A. McGuire and Robert L. Ohsfeldt, “An Economic Model of Voting Behavior over
Specific Issues at the Constitutional Convention of 1787,” The Journal of Economic History 46:1
(1986): 79-111.
22
Robert A. McGuire and Robert L. Ohsfeldt, “Self-Interest, Agency Theory, and Political
Voting Behavior: The Ratification of the United States Constitution,” The American Economic
Review 79:1 (1989): 219-34; quotation from p. 232.
23
Jac C. Heckelman and Keith L. Dougherty, “An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional
9

Heckelman and Dougherty themselves followed Beard’s trail. They re-examined the data
and subjected it to a statistical analysis that considered the Philadelphia Convention delegate
votes in a “pooled cross-section.” They concluded that “proxies for personal economic interests
and personal ideology” were better predictors of voting behavior than “proxies for constituent
economic interests and constituent ideology”. In sum, they found that Beard’s economic
interpretation of delegates’ voting behavior was more important than many have credited: it was
more personally driven than constituent driven.24 In a subsequent essay, Heckelman and
Dougherty tried to infer delegate votes “on all substantive motions” during the Constitutional
Convention.25 This time, they gave limited support to Beard’s economic interpretation. Beard,
they pointed out, “claimed that delegates who owned personalty controlled the Convention and
inserted clauses into the Constitution that favored their interests, often against the interests of
those who owned land.” Heckelman’s and Dougherty’s analysis, in contrast, “suggests that
plantation owners were much more in control of the Convention than their landholding status
might suggest.” Delegates who “owned large plantations and represented constituents with
interests in agriculture should have been considerably more influential than Beards thesis
suggests.”26
Economic historians, then, had carried forward a lively discussion of Beard’s economic
interpretation while other historian-scholars debated a political interpretation that dominated in
Convention of 1787 Revisited,” The Journal of Economic History 67:4 (2007): 829-48, quotation
from p. 830. See also Jac C. Heckelman and Keith L. Dougherty, “A Spatial Analysis of
Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention,” The Journal of Economic History 73:2
(2013): 407-444.
24
Ibid., 831, 846-47.
25
Jac C. Heckelman and Keith L. Dougherty, “A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the
Constitutional Convention,” The Journal of Economic History 73:2 (2013): 407-444; quotation
from p 438.
26
Ibid., 437-38.
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the traditional historical journals.27 In a special 1987 Forum on the Constitution in the William
and Mary Quarterly, Jackson Turner Main observed that economic analyses of Constitutional
formation had been eclipsed by political explanations. “This may change,” he wrote in his first
footnote, citing McGuire’s and Ohsfeldt’s 1984 essay.28 Had he lived to see it, Main would have
been gratified by Robert McGuire’s 2003 book, To Form a More Perfect Union, which offered
historians of all stripes a thorough discussion of an economic analysis of the Constitution. 29 This
book particularly impressed John Murray as a work of history. McGuire examined primary
documents, analyzed and interpreted them, and told a story that explained what he found. He
dedicated a 15-page appendix to a description of his sources. McGuire built a clear road from
the sources to the statistical analysis and then to the written interpretation. His book was not
economics with old data, and not a pre-determined exercise in ideological reassurance, but
history as it should be done, carefully and in a scholarly fashion. McGuire’s work demonstrated
powerfully that the scholarly conversation on Charles Beard had not stopped with Forrest
McDonald’s books.
This ongoing conversation on Beard could profit from the Rhode Island town voter data,
which gives scholars information beyond the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia and
beyond the state ratifying conventions. The Philadelphia material has been well worked, and the
state convention data has been the subject of valuable studies. Van Beck Hall, for example,
examined the votes cast by town representatives at the Massachusetts ratifying convention; he
27

This paragraph is based on John Murray’s comments on To Form A More Perfect Union by
Robert A. McGuire, delivered at the Social Science History Association Conference in Chicago
in November 2004.
28
Jackson Turner Main, “An Agenda for Research on the Origins and Nature of the Constitution
of 1787-1788,” William and Mary Quarterly 44:3 (1987): 591-96; quotation from p. 593.
29
Robert A. McGuire, To Form a More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of the
United States Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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divided the towns into three categories, roughly equal in population.30 Hall discovered that the
most commercial-cosmopolitan towns, which ran Massachusetts’ commercial life, elected
representatives who strongly favored the Constitution (82 percent of these towns voted for
ratification). The least commercial-cosmopolitan towns elected representatives who strongly
opposed the Constitution (29 percent of these towns voted for ratification). The middling towns
split on the issue (51 percent voted for ratification).31 This correlation between commercial
wealth and Federalist support is, in broad strokes, compatible with Beard’s interpretation. But
while Hall’s method accounts for the majority decisions within each town, it does not take into
consideration possible strong minorities within the towns. Heated debate over ratification might
well have split communities, leaving only a small margin of victory for the majority. The
ordinary voter who did not attend a ratifying convention remains out of sight.
Rhode Island’s unique voter lists enable us to go directly to the town meetings and focus
on individual town voters. Correlating these voting lists with individual economic data allows a
closer examination of economic motivation behind the Federalist-Antifederalist split in Rhode
Island. In Exeter, Hopkinton, Jamestown, Little Compton, Middletown, Portsmouth, and
Tiverton, we can see the greater wealth held by pro-ratification voters. The Tiverton data in
particular shows a polarization between large and small holders of personal estates, bolstering
Beard’s economic interpretation of the Constitution.

III. Political and Economic Context of the Rhode Island Referendum

30

Van Beck Hall, Politics Without Parties: Massachusetts, 1780-1791 (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1972).
31
Ibid., 286-92.
12

The call for a popular referendum on the Constitution was logical and unsurprising in
Rhode Island. A highly charged political atmosphere permeated the state in the late 1770s and
1780s. Local issues of tax collection and paper money emissions dominated elections when the
new Constitution arrived for inspection. Rhode Island was long accustomed to considerable
political freedom and self-government under a generous colonial charter. Freemen often
participated in political disputes that resulted in a rapid turnover among elected officials and
earned the state a reputation for factionalism well before the Revolution.32 This state of politics
evidenced itself in independent, non-conformist behavior during the Confederation Period.
The town meeting formed a key element of Rhode Island’s political structure. Although
the General Assembly provided the arena for thrashing out differences between communities
within the state, the towns ultimately provided both the cause and the resolution of conflicts
within the legislature. Town meetings regularly gave detailed and confining instructions to their
elected deputies to the General Assembly; in turn, the General Assembly frequently required the
towns to validate the Assembly’s actions by referendum.33
In this way, the town meeting gave substantial authority to the individual voter who
chose to interest himself in politics. Further, Rhode Island had minimal property requirements
for the franchise. Property ownership was widespread, and historians estimate that 75 percent of
Rhode Island’s adult males were eligible to vote in mid-eighteenth century.34 This figure
probably increased in the Confederation period, when emissions of paper money made property

32

David S. Lovejoy, Rhode Island Politics and the American Revolution, 1760-1776
(Providence: Brown University Press, 1958), 29-30 and passim.
33
Irving Polishook, Rhode Island and the Union, 1774-1795 (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1969), 32-35.
34
Lovejoy, 16; Joel Cohen, “Rhode Island and the American Revolution” (Ph.D. diss.,
University of Connecticut, 1968), 5.
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requirements even easier to meet.35 The combination of a wide franchise and strong town
authority in state-wide matters made Rhode Island “uniquely susceptible to popular control.”36
The history of Rhode Island during the Confederation Period, therefore, is one of strong
factionalism over state and national matters, divisions that were thrashed out in town meetings as
well as in the state legislature.
More than most states, Rhode Island had suffered economically and socially from the
upheavals of the Revolutionary War. British occupation severely damaged Newport and sent it
into a commercial decline from which it never fully recovered. British soldiers burned and
pillaged many of the exposed towns along Narragansett Bay. British soldiers, French soldiers,
and the American militia each in turn occupied portions of Aquidneck Island, site of Newport,
Middletown, and Portsmouth. Even those citizens who lived in inland towns and farms suffered
economic distress during the war. Threatened by British troops and suffering from internal
upheavals, the state legislature unanimously ratified the Articles of Confederation in 1778, eager
to be connected to the other states in time of trouble.37
Without the pressing exigencies of the war, however, Rhode Island’s passion for
connection soon passed. The state’s internal economic and political needs drew it increasingly
away from national concerns. The General Assembly unanimously vetoed the proposed Impost
of 1781, designed to strengthen the fiscal power of Congress by giving it an independent income
through a tax on imported goods. The Impost of 1783 received the same treatment. Having

35

Polishook, Union, 29-30.
Ibid., 37.
37
This and the following paragraphs in this section are drawn largely from Herndon, “Governing
the Affairs of the Town,” 104-31.
36
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recently shaken off British customs laws, Rhode Islanders rejected any similar attempts by the
Confederation to restrict their vital commercial interests.
Not only individual citizens had suffered financially as a result of the war; Rhode Island
itself was heavily in debt. From 1784 to 1786, post-war economic depression plagued the state,
evidenced primarily by the disappearance of hard money to out-of-state and European creditors.
Financially distressed Rhode Islanders tended to blame merchants for the hard times, creating a
gap of resentment. Indebted farmers called out for issuance of paper money, which would
enable the state government to make loans to individuals who needed a way to pay their
creditors. Merchants and creditors strongly resisted the printing of new money as inflationary
and an attack on the value of their rightful property. The two largest commercial centers in the
state, Newport and Providence, became strongholds of opposition to the proposed paper money
issue. But these two towns were in the distinct minority, an indication of the widespread distress
in Rhode Island.38
The struggles between debtor and creditor interests rapidly assumed political forms.
Paper money advocates swept the annual election of 1786; freemen, eager for economic relief,
voted out the mercantile coalition that had controlled the state legislature in the preceding years.
The new legislators, forming a Country party, had pledged to support paper money, and they
were as good as their word. In 1786, the Rhode Island General Assembly passed paper money

38

On Rhode Island’s paper money crisis, see Polishook, Union; John Paul Kaminski, “Paper
Politics: The Northern State Loan-Offices During the Confederation, 1783-1790” (Ph.D. diss.,
University of Wisconsin, 1972); Roger H. Brown, Redeeming the Republic: Federalists,
Taxation, and the Origins of the Constitution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993),
83-96; Jackson Turner Main, The Antifederalists: Critics of the Constitution, 1781-1788 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961); and Patrick T. Conley, Democracy in Decline:
Rhode Island's Constitutional Development, 1776-1841 (Providence: Rhode Island Historical
Society, 1977).
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legislation designed to reduce personal debt and remove the state debt by the end of 1789. The
laws had teeth: they included heavy penalties for any creditors who refused to accept the paper
money as legal tender.
Despite the legal strictures, many merchants refused to accept paper money, regarding it
as unfair, a cheater’s way of settling debts. When faced with legal action, some merchants
refused to open their stores and sent their goods to warehouses and safe places far away from
angry customers. Farmers retaliated by withholding their produce from market centers.
Meanwhile, the General Assembly continued to enact legislation based on paper money. The
result was a virtual polarization in the populace: the largest merchants drew into one camp; the
majority of the farmers into the other. This was the hostile political environment entered by the
new Constitution.
Before the Constitutional Convention of 1787, some political observers had viewed
Rhode Island’s factionalism as proof of the need for a strong federal government to check the
excessive democracy of the states. The dispute over paper money strengthened this opinion.
Angry merchant creditors did nothing to disabuse outsiders of the distorted notion that Rhode
Island was on the brink of chaos and anarchy, while the interests of the minority (that is, the
merchants) went unheeded. The state legislature made matters worse by trying to use its suspect
paper money to meet Rhode Island’s share of Congressional requisitions and to pay debts to outof-state creditors. Rhode Island served as the perfect foil for Federalists looking for tangible
proof of the need for an energetic central government to curb the factionalism of wayward
states.39

39

Polishook, Union, 165-78.
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Suggestions for strengthening the federal government fell on deaf ears in the Rhode
Island state house. The General Assembly, jealous of its ability to control its own destiny and
elected because of its support of paper money emission, feared that the federal government
would interfere with the state’s efforts to settle its internal debt by issuing paper money. The
alienated merchants, however, gladly received the proposed Constitution. They saw the
proposed Federal Constitution as a godsend, believing it would put a halt to the paper money
policy of the Country party.40 In this way, the issues of creation and ratification of the
Constitution matched the political divisions already present in Rhode Island.
The General Assembly had refused to send delegates to the Constitutional Convention in
May of 1787, protesting that any constitutional changes should be made in accordance with the
Articles of Confederation, which did not authorize a separate convention. The state legislature
further declared that it could not appoint delegates for a convention which was “for the express
purpose of altering a Constitution, which the people at large are only capable of appointing the
Members.”41 A few other reluctant states sent their delegates with strict instructions only to
revise the Articles of Confederation; but Rhode Island alone was unrepresented at the
Constitutional Convention.
When the proposed Constitution arrived in Providence in October 1787, it was received
without enthusiasm. As part of their proceedings on the last Monday in October, the General
Assembly voted that copies of the proposed Constitution be printed and distributed to the towns
in order that “the freemen may have an opportunity of forming their sentiments of the proposed

40

Ibid, 171.
Merrill Jensen, ed., The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, vol. 1,
Constitutional Documents and Records, 1776-1787 (Madison: State Historical Society of
Wisconsin, 1976), 226.
41
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constitution.”42 The official record shows no mention of a ratifying convention, which Congress
had specified when it sent the Constitution on to the states.
Arriving in the midst of the paper-money controversy, the Federal Constitution
immediately provided a new focus for old antagonisms. The debate over ratification was heated
and vituperative. Some who wanted the Constitution questioned the moral character of those
who did not; and some who rejected the Constitution attacked the motives of their opponents.
Some merchants thought that debtors rejected a stronger federal government because it would
prevent them from solving their financial problems through paper money. Some struggling
farmers feared that new Constitution would establish “iron government,” ignoring their local
concerns and destroying liberty.43
Between these two extremes stood Rhode Islanders who were neither totally enamored of
nor totally hostile to the Constitution. One such person was Ezra Stiles, pastor of the Second
Congregational Church in Newport. On 24 December 1787, Stiles noted in his diary:
I have formed this as my Opinion. 1. That it is not the most pfect Constitution
yet 2. That it is a very good one, & that it is advisable to adopt it. However 3.
That tho’ much of it will be pmanent & lasting, yet much of it will be hereafter
altered by future Revisions. And 4. That the best one remains yet to be
investigated.44
Those who felt strongly that the Constitution was necessary, the Federalists, were
concentrated in Newport and Providence, where they used the press as a means of conveying
their enthusiasm for ratification and their sarcasm against those who resisted. They also had a
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persistent, if minority, voice in the state legislature, where they repeatedly called for a ratifying
convention.
In the February 1788 session, the General Assembly ignored Federalists demands for a
ratifying convention and instead voted to call a popular referendum to decide the issue. The
Federalists were outraged, claiming that the towns were controlled by “town bosses.”45 The
Antifederalist majority in the Assembly was unmoved, perhaps sensitive to the charges of
bullying and manipulation in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that had appeared on the
front pages of Rhode Island newspapers.46 The General Assembly issued an order for the
referendum; and on 24 March 1788, every town in Rhode Island held a town meeting for the
express purpose of hearing the voice of the freemen on the issue of ratification. The results of
these votes (Table 1) were submitted to the general assembly at their session on the last Monday
in March 1788.
Federalists boycotted the balloting, a measure that was particularly effective in Newport
and Providence (see Table 1). John Kaminski has argued that the boycott was meant to conceal
the Federalists’ weakness and has asserted that even if all the Federalists in Providence and
Newport had voted, they still would have received “fewer than half the total votes of the
Antifederalists.”47 Kaminski has suggested that the Antifederalists also stayed away from the
referendum in Newport and Providence, fearing social and economic repercussions.48
Twenty-eight towns showed an Antifederalist majority, with seven towns achieving
unanimous rejection of ratification. The overall strength of Antifederalist sentiment elsewhere
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highlights the Federalist victories in Little Compton and Bristol. Whatever boycott the
Federalists organized did not appear to affect these two towns. Little Compton displayed
Federalist sentiment even before the referendum was called. On 1 January 1788 the town’s
freemen instructed their deputies to try to persuade the General Assembly to call a ratifying
convention as soon as possible. The majority of the townspeople considered the new
Constitution “a Plan of Government Well Adapted to the Present Critical Situation of our
National Affairs” and they believed it would meet “the Extreme Need We Stand in of a Well
Organized Energetic National Government.”49 Despite overwhelming anti-ratification opinion in
most of the state, then, there were pockets of Federalist sympathy outside the expected
strongholds of Newport and Providence.
After the stunning Federalist defeat in the referendum, the state legislature accordingly
vetoed the proposed Constitution. Federalists considered the referendum a fraudulent measure,
since the Constitution itself stipulated ratification by a convention, and they continued to agitate
for such a gathering. But an Antifederalist majority in the General Assembly blocked every
attempt by Federalists to call a ratifying convention until 1790, after the state had paid off its
debt, thus illustrating the tight link between the paper money issue and the Constitution. On 25
June 1788, Rev. Ezra Stiles recorded in his diary the news that New Hampshire had ratified the
Constitution (the ninth state to do so) and speculated about the coming decisions of New York,
Virginia, and North Carolina. He remained pessimistic about his own state, however, when he
added: “Rh. Isld will come to her Senses again after recoverg from the Frenzy of Paper
Money.”50
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Rhode Island did “come to her Senses” in 1790. In January of that year, the General
Assembly finally capitulated and called for a ratifying convention to meet on 1 March. The
March meeting was adjourned until 24 May without bringing the issue to a vote, however. And
by May, the town of Providence had seceded from the state and refused to rejoin it unless the
Constitution was ratified. This threat weakened Antifederalist sentiment enough to allow
ratification to proceed. On 29 May 1790, Rhode Island adopted the Constitution in the closest
vote of the thirteen states: 34 to 32.51
The Federalists did not have a clear victory. In his study of the distribution of the vote on
ratification, Charles W. Roll, Jr., reports that the delegates voting for the Constitution
represented only 44.1 percent of the population, whereas the delegates voting against represented
51.4 percent.52 Further, the ratification of the Constitution may have hinged on one man:
delegate William Peckham, Jr., of Middletown. Peckham, who voted against ratification in the
town referendum (Appendix 1, p. 25, case 39), resigned as convention delegate and was replaced
by Mr. Elisha Barker, who had voted for ratification in the referendum (Appendix 1, p. 23, case
1). This substitution of delegates was the last official act in the convention before the official
vote was taken. Barker, voting for the Constitution, enabled the question to pass by a margin of
two votes; had Peckham been present and continued to resist ratification, the vote would have
been a tie.53
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IV. Economic Analysis of the Rhode Island Referendum
Rhode Island's Antifederalists were largely pro-paper-money people; and pro-papermoney people were generally rural farmers. Thus we should be able to make a tidy chart with
rural farmers on one side and coastal merchants on the other. But the referendum vote was far
more ambiguous than such a chart would indicate.
Jackson Turner Main explains the two Federalist victories in Little Compton and Bristol
as a function of the strong mercantile interests in those two coastal towns. He also suggests that
the unanimous Antifederalist victories in the inland towns reflect an absence of mercantile
interests in those areas. “The significant difference in Rhode Island was that of the coast versus
the interior.”54 This assertion leaves important questions unanswered. Why did Portsmouth
have more Antifederalists than Bristol? Both are port towns on Narragansett Bay. Why did
Hopkinton, a rural farm community, show a stronger Federalist interest than South Kingston,
another land-locked area to the east? Strongholds of coastal merchant interest produced
Antifederalists. Strongholds of rural farm interest produced Federalists. The “town” variable
may have masked another, more important variable that determined how a man voted.
To probe more deeply at the connection between town wealth and pro-ratification
sentiment, I ranked the towns (except Newport and Providence) according to strength of proratification sentiment in their total vote; I also ranked the towns according to mean household
wealth in land and houses. A rank-order test performed on this data resulted in an rs of .019,
clearly indicating that there was no relationship between wealth of the town and pro-ratification
voting strength. (See Appendix 2, pp. 72-74.)55
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Another town-based approach was to look at the town leaders in relation to the town
voters. Did the town fathers show the same opinion about ratification as the ordinary freemen?
Or did the position of authority separate the leaders from others? Using those town officers
holding what Edward M. Cook calls “major offices” (clerk, councilman, sergeant, and
treasurer),56 I compiled statistics for each town and measured the strength of pro-ratification vote
by the town leaders against the pro-ratification vote by all voters. Town leaders, it appears, were
significantly more pro-ratification than other voters (Table 4). I also tested for a significant
difference of wealth between town leaders and other voters, looking for a connection between
greater wealth among town leaders and greater pro-ratification sentiment. In line with Edward
Cook’s assertion that wealth was not the primary qualification for town leaders in eighteenthcentury New England,57 the computations show that there was a significant difference of wealth
between town leaders and voters in only three of the six towns: Exeter, Middletown, and
Tiverton (Table 4).
This greater wealth did not neatly correlate to vote on ratification, however. Exeter’s
town leaders, significantly wealthier than the voters, showed no pro-ratification strength at all:
they registered a unanimous rejection of the Constitution (Table 4). Similarly, Tiverton’s town
leaders, significantly wealthier than the voters, showed less pro-ratification strength than the
voters (Table 4). Middletown is the only town which shows a positive correlation between both
greater wealth and stronger pro-ratification vote. But Middletown’s statistics are themselves
suspect: half the town leaders did not vote, and the resulting computations are based on a small
sample size of five (Table 4, Note 1).
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The statistics on town leaders indicate that the freemen did not always second the
opinions of their elected officials. This is particularly evident in Little Compton, where the town
leaders showed remarkable solidarity of pro-ratification sentiment not reflected in the other
voters. If Little Compton is representative, then the voters were motivated by something
stronger than respect for and deference to the opinions of their leaders. If Charles Beard and
Jackson Turner Main are right, the motivation was in their pocketbooks.

V. Further Opportunities for Analysis of the Referendum
How might this Rhode Island data contribute further to the conversation about Beard’s
economic interpretation of the Constitution? How might it initiate and foster scholarly dialogue
between economists and historians about the validity of Beard’s theory? Such conversations
would be in keeping with John Murray’s vision of interdisciplinary collaboration.
The Federalist boycott in Newport and Providence presents important lines of further
research. Did this boycott suppress voter turnout elsewhere? If the missing votes from these two
towns are accounted for, the voter turnout for the referendum, 27.4 percent (see Table 1), is
similar to the turnout for state elections held in the same time period.58 Still, voters might have
been more inclined to turn out for a constitutional matter. Just as critical is the question of who
was willing to vote in the face of the Federalist boycott. Perhaps only those Federalists who felt
very secure in their community standing dared to vote, while poorer Federalists feared social or
economic penalties. If so, then the pro-ratification vote is biased towards the wealthier voters.
The correlation between wealth and “yea” vote holds even in Little Compton, where Federalists
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won a narrow victory; but the wealth gap is the narrowest there, thus supporting a hypothesis that
only the wealthy were likely to voice their opposition.
Family or clan voting would provide another fruitful avenue of research. The voter lists
show clusters of people who shared the same last name and the vital records indicate how
marriage linked families that bore different surnames. How were the Rhode Island voters
connected to each other by kinship ties? Does the correlation between wealth and vote hold
when extended into family groupings?
John Murray had identified slave ownership in particular as an important trail to follow.
Charles Beard had posited that Southern slaveholders constituted a particular interest group that
might have opposed the Constitution, fearing that a union would impose “commercial
regulations devised immediately in behalf of northern interests.” However, Beard argued, these
Southern slaveholders owned personal estate other than slaves, and these other economic
interests “cut through state boundaries.”59 It would be useful, then, to discover the relationship
between slave ownership and opinion on the Constitution in Rhode Island, a state with “the
largest concentration of blacks in New England.”60 In 1750, enslaved people made up 10 percent
of the Rhode Island’s total population, a figure which dropped to 6 percent in 1770, as the “white
population doubled, primarily as a result of immigration.”61 In 1783, 21 percent of Rhode
Island’s “Mulattoes” and “Blacks” lived in one seaport – Newport – and almost 17 percent of the
population of agrarian (quasi-plantation) South Kingstown were either “Mulattoes” or “Blacks”;
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one scholar has argued that Narragansett Country (South Kingstown and its bordering townships)
was a “slave society within a society with slaves.”62 Anti-slavery (predominantly Quaker) and
slaveholder interests waged a protracted battle in the Rhode Island legislature from 1775 onward
until they finally compromised on gradual abolition legislation in 1784.63 Under this statute,
children born of slave mothers after March 1, 1784, would be free on their eighteenth (girls) or
twenty-first (boys) birthdays; meanwhile, they were raised as servants to their mothers’ masters.
The social, economic, and political interests of Rhode Island slaveholders would likely surface in
their debates over the Constitution in 1787-90.
In their 1984 study, McGuire and Ohsfeldt looked specifically at slaveholding as a factor
and discovered that “delegates with a large share of their assets in the form of slaves were
significantly less likely to vote for the Constitution than were those with no slaves.”64 In fact,
slaveholders were the one possible exception to their general conclusion that Beard was right
about the “division of interests” at the ratifying conventions, since slaveowners generally
opposed the Constitution.65 In contrast, Heckelman and Dougherty, in their 2013 study, found
that “owning slaves tends to move a delegate in a pro-national direction (i.e., to the right).”66
Given this diversity of conclusions, it would be highly useful to include the Rhode Island
referendum voters in any consideration of the correlation between slaveownership and sentiment
towards the Constitution.
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John Murray had begun identifying slaveholders among Rhode Islanders who voted on
the 1788 referendum. Likely sources of information were the first federal census of 1790 and
local data in the form of probate records, since estate inventories usually listed slaves. Very
likely, Murray would have worked economic history magic with existing and new-found data,
subjected it to more sophisticated statistical analysis, and rendered it highly significant for the
ongoing discussion of an economic interpretation of the Constitution. My hope now is that
enterprising historian-scholars who love both data and the archives will carry on the story of
Rhode Island’s referendum, listening for the questions that ordinary voters were asking about the
form of government proposed in the Constitution, and analyzing their votes on ratification with
sensitivity to context. What was town clerk Walter Cook telling us about his community when
he voted against ratification in Tiverton in 1788? What was town clerk Abraham Anthony
telling us about his community when he abstained from the voting in Portsmouth on the same
day? How did they interpret the new Constitution?
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Table 1. 1788 Ratification Referendum Vote and Voter Turnout in Rhode Island, by Towns67
Town

Yea Votes

Nay Votes

Total Votes

Barrington
Bristol
Charlestown
Coventry
Cranston
Cumberland
East Greenwich
Exeter
Foster
Glocester
Hopkinton
Jamestown
Johnston
Little Compton
Middletown
Newport
New Shoreham
North Kingstown
North Providence
Portsmouth
Providence
Richmond
Scituate
Smithfield
South Kingstown
Tiverton
Warren
Warwick
Westerly
West Greenwich
TOTALS

9
26
6
0
0
10
2
6
0
9 (10)
33
5
1
63
6
1
0
2
0
12
0
1
0
2
1
23
2
3
12
2
237 (238)

34
23
51
180
101
113
91
136 (142)
177
228 (227)
95
11
79
57
40
10
32
160
48
60
1
68
156
158
125
92
41
140
56
145
2708 (2713)

43
49
57
180
101
123
93
142 (148)
177
237
128
16
80
120
46
11
32
162
48
72
1
69
156
160
126
115
43
143
68
147
2945 (2951)

Percent of
Eligible
Voters68
34.1
20.0
21.5
37.1
28.9
32.8
27.9
31.8
45.0
32.1
32.3
21.1
32.4
42.4
27.5
1.0
26.0
35.0
24.4
23.3
0.1
25.4
36.6
26.7
21.0
26.6
20.0
32.6
19.1
37.1
27.4

Yea and Nay votes and totals were extrapolated from the manuscript voting lists in “Papers Relating to
the Adoption of the Constitution of the United States,” Rhode Island State Archives, and from original
manuscripts in the various town clerks’ offices. Vote totals are from Bartlett in Rhode Island Records,
10:275, amended in parentheses. The results for Exeter and Glocester were apparently miscopied into the
official record. These totals differ slightly from Kaminski et al, Ratification of the Constitution: Rhode
Island, 25:421 (238 for and 2714 against).
68
Figures for eligible voters from Robert J. Dinkin, Voting in Revolutionary America: A Study of
Elections in the Original Thirteen States, 1776-1789 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), 113.
67
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Table 2. Means of Voters’ Tax and Estate Values, by Town
Town

Valuation

Exeter
Hopkinton
Hopkinton
Jamestown
Jamestown
Little Compton
Middletown
Middletown
Portsmouth
Portsmouth
Tiverton
Tiverton

1787 Tax
1787 Tax
1788 Tax
1787 Estate
1788 Tax #3
1798 Tax
1783 Tax
1783 Estate
1783 Estate
1798 Tax
1784 Tax
1788 Tax

Mean of Yea
Voters
84.00s
£2.89
£5.90
£624.80
146.60s
$2.44
69.00s
£1977.00
£1405.33
$3.51
79.19s
129.13s

Mean of Nay
Voters
54.29s
£1.27
£2.84
£370.45
74.73s
$1.88
40.64s
£801.63
£406.87
$1.87
41.68s
48.95s

Statistically
Significant?
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES

Sources of Data: Hopkinton and Jamestown tax and estate valuation records are at the respective
town clerks’ offices; Little Compton, Middletown, and Portsmouth tax and estate valuation
records are at the Rhode Island State Archives; Exeter and Tiverton tax records are at the Rhode
Island Historical Society Library.
Table 3. Personal and Real Estate Means, Tiverton
Statistic
1788 Personal Estate Tax Mean
1788 Real Estate Tax Mean

“Yea” Voters
9.61s
113.96s
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“Nay” Voters
1.62s
41.72s

All Taxpayers
4.13s
39.11s

Table 4. Pro-Ratification Vote and Wealth, Voters and Town Leaders
Town
Town
Town
Leaders
Voters:
Leaders:
Town
who
ProProVoters:
Voted:
Means
Ratificati Ratification
Mean
Mean
Test
Statistically
Town
on Vote
Vote
Wealth
Wealth
T-score Significant?
Exeter
4.05%
0.00%
55.54s
69.13s
-3.8698
YES
Jamestown
31.25%
33.33%
97.19s
72.00s
.9827
NO
Little Compton
52.50%
85.71%
$2.20
$2.25
-.2380
NO
Middletown
13.04%
60.00%
44.10s
61.40s
-1.7191
YES
Portsmouth
16.67%
20.00%
£573.28
£611.75
-.4163
NO
Tiverton
20.00%
16.67%
65.72s
85.00s
-2.0895
YES
Note 1: The number of town leaders who voted varied from town to town:
8 out of 9 voted in Exeter; 0 voted to ratify
3 out of 7 voted in Jamestown; 1 voted to ratify
7 out of 9 voted in Little Compton; 6 voted to ratify
5 out of 9 voted in Middletown; 3 voted to ratify
5 out of 9 voted in Portsmouth; 1 voted to ratify
6 out of 9 voted in Tiverton; 1 voted to ratify
Note 2: The sources of wealth data are as follows: Exeter 1787 tax; Jamestown 1788 tax; Little
Compton 1798 tax; Middletown 1783 tax; Portsmouth 1783 estate valuation; Tiverton 1788 tax.
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